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Finding ‘the most highly qualified 
publicists’: Lessons from the 





The ICJ Statute Article 38(1) instructs the International Court of Justice to ‘apply […] 
the teachings of the most highly qualified publicists’. This raises the question of how 
to decide who these ‘publicists’ are, and how to rank them. This article suggests four 
factors that the Court’s judges apparently use when assessing the weight of 
‘teachings’: the quality of the work, the expertise and official positions of the 
author(s), and agreement between multiple authors. Judges may invoke these factors 
because it can make their opinions more authoritative and saves time, and in order to 
conform with the ICJ Statute Article 38. Counting the authors and teachings that 
judges have highlighted as having high quality, being experts, and holding prestigious 
official positions gives a list that is different from the lists of writers who are cited 
most often and by the most judges. While this gives a rough idea of who ‘the most 
highly qualified publicists’ may be, it also shows that a final, conclusive ranking 
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This article explores ‘factors’ that determine the weight of teachings in international 
law. ‘Teachings’, which are mentioned in the ICJ Statute Article 38(1)(d),1 are here 
defined as ‘books and articles, purporting to answer legal questions, being used when 
ascertaining the content of international law’.2 Works produced by the International 
Law Commission (ILC) are excluded, because of the significant role of States in their 
production.  
 
The article uses the practice of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) as a case 
study.3 The ICJ is the most authoritative international court,4 and has a publicly 
available record of case law that stretches over 70 years, yet without being 
unmanageably large. Individual opinions are included in the study. Only a few ICJ 
majority opinions have cited teachings:5 The Court’s decision in Land, Island and 
Maritime Frontier Dispute made reference to ‘the successive editors of Oppenheim’s 
International Law’ and to ‘G. Gidel, Le droit international de la mer (1934), Vol. 3’, 
and a work by Sir Cecil Hurst.6 The Namibia opinion cited a work by Jan Smuts.7 In 
Kasikili/Sedudu Island one finds a reference to a document produced by the Institut de 
droit international.8 Works produced by the ICRC have been cited in the Wall 
opinion9 and the Nicaragua judgment.10 The reference in Bosnia Genocide to Raphael 
                                                 
1 Statute of the International Court of Justice (adopted 26 June 1945, entered into force 24 October 
1945) 33 UNTS 933 (ICJ Statute). 
2 Sondre Torp Helmersen, ‘The Use of Scholarship by the WTO Appellate Body’ (2016) 7 Goettingen 
Journal of International Law 309, 314. 
3 Between Admission of a State to the United Nations (Charter, Art. 4), Advisory Opinion: I.C.J. 
Reports 1948, p. 57 and Obligations concerning Negotiations relating to Cessation of the Nuclear 
Arms Race and to Nuclear Disarmament (Marshall Islands v. United Kingdom), Preliminary 
Objections, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2016, p. 833.  
4 Eg D J Harris, Cases and Materials on International Law (8th edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2015) 42. 
5 Eg Robert Jennings and Arthur Watts (eds), Oppenheim’s International Law, vol 1 (9th edn, 
Longman 1992) 42-43. 
6 Land, Island and Maritime Frontier Dispute (El Salvador/Honduras: Nicaragua intervening), 
Judgment of 11 September 1992, I.C.J. Reports 1992, p. 351, 592 and 594. 
7 Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West 
Africa) notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 
1971, p. 16, 48. 
8 Kasikili/Sedudu Island (Botswana/Namibia), Judgment, I.C.J. Report 1999, p. 1045, 1062. 
9 Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory 
Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 2004, p. 136, 176. (The reference at 175 is excluded because the works was 
apparently produced by governments rather than the ICRC.) 
10 Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of 
America), Merits, Judgment. I.C.J. Reports 1986, p. 14, 124-125. 
 
 
Lemkin’s book Axis Rule in Occupied Europe (1944) is not counted,11 since it 
concerned only the ‘etymology of the word […] genocide’, rather than a legal 
question. Some ICJ majority opinions contain general references without naming 
specific works.12 In short, the Court has cited specific works of teachings on a point of 
law only seven times, in five cases. Teachings are cited far more in individual 
opinions, where the Court’s ‘“workings” are set out in more detail’, and they may 
therefore (better) ‘reflect the Court’s actual methods’.13 Individual opinions should 
‘be regarded as throwing light upon the Court's deliberations in preparing its 
judgment’.14 This is true regardless of the fact that as sources of law, individual 
opinions are generally seen as less important than majority opinions.15  
 
The ICJ Statute Article 38(1) mentions ‘the teachings of the most highly qualified 
publicists’ as a ‘subsidiary means’ to be apply by the Court when it ‘decide[s] in 
accordance with international law such disputes as are submitted to it’. Thus, the 
Court is expressly directed to ‘apply’ teachings. The provision formally only applies 
to the ICJ,16 but is generally assumed to reflect customary international law.17 This, 
combined with the authoritative status of the ICJ, and the resulting desire for other 
actors to follow its practice, means that a study of the Court’s citation practice is 
significant for international law in general. The conclusions in this article are thus not 
limited to showing the Court’s practice, they also say something about the status of 
teachings in international law as such. 
 
Section 2 discusses a fundamental premise for the subsequent sections, which is that 
the weight of teachings varies between different works. Section 3 identifies the 
                                                 
11 Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia 
and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2007, p. 43, 125. 
12 Nottebohm Case (second phase), Judgment of April 6th, 1955: I.C.J. Reports 1955, p. 4, 22-23; 
Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1996, p. 226, 
259; North Sea Continental Shelf, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1969, p. 3, 35; LaGrand (Germany v. 
United States of America), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2001, p. 466, 501 and 508. 
13 James Crawford, Brownlie’s Principles of Public International Law (8th edn, Oxford University 
Press 2012) 43. 
14 D W Greig, International Law (2nd edn, Butterworths 1976) 48. Similarly Shabtai Rosenne, The 
Perplexities of Modern International Law (Martinus Nijhoff 2004) 44. 
15 Eg Michel Virally, ‘The Sources of International Law’, in Max Sørensen (ed), Manual of Public 
International Law (St. Martin's Press 1968) 116, 153-154.  
16 Eg Gerald G Fitzmaurice, ‘Some Problems Regarding the Formal Sources of International Law’ in 
Martti Koskenniemi (ed), Sources of International Law (Ashgate 2000) 57, 77. 
17 Eg G M Danilenko, Law-Making in the International Community (Martinus Nijhoff 1993) 33-36. 
 
 
‘factors’ that seem to determine the weight of specific works. The following Section 
(4) shows how the ICJ judges’ practice also indicates that authority in international 
law is established and maintained through a collective process, that is largely implicit 
instead of being conducted openly. Section 5 then discusses incentives that could 
motivate judges to distinguish between more and less authoritative works, and to 
prefer to cite the former.  Section 6 uses the ‘factors’ presented in Section 3 as part of 
a methodology for identifying the writers who, apparently according to the ICJ, are 
‘the most highly qualified’. Section 7 is a conclusion. 
 
2. DIFFERENT WORKS HAVE DIFFERENT WEIGHT 
The notion that there are ‘factors’ that determine the weight of teachings necessarily 
means that different works have different weight. The varying weight of teachings can 
to some extent be inferred from the wording of the ICJ Statute Article 38(1)(d), which 
mentions ‘the teachings of the most highly qualified publicists’ (emphasis added). 
This wording assumes that some writers are more qualified than others, and that only 
the ‘most qualified’ are relevant to the ICJ. The wording of the Statute suggests an 
either/or distinction between ‘the most highly qualified’ and the rest, where the ICJ 
can only apply the teachings of the former. However, it is ‘difficult to decide who 
“the most highly qualified publicists”’ are.18 The standard is to some extent 
‘subjective’,19 and ‘cannot be conclusively proved’.20 The concept of ‘qualification’ 
should be seen as a gradual progression from the least to the most qualified, where the 
more highly qualified are assigned more weight.21 That is what ICJ judges seem to do, 
by citing some writers more than others (as discussed in this section) and by 
emphasising various ‘factors’ that seem to affect the weight of teachings (as discussed 
in Section 3).  
 
                                                 
18 Clive Parry, The Sources and Evidence of International Law (Manchester University Press 1965) 
108. 
19 Eg Tim Hillier, Sourcebook on Public International Law (Cavendish 1998) 94. 
20 Eg Rebecca M M Wallace and Olga Martin-Ortega, International Law (7th edn, Sweet & Maxwell 
2013) 30. 
21 Fuad Zarbiyev, ‘Saying Credibly What the Law Is: On Marks of Authority in International Law’ 
(2018) 9 Journal of International Dispute Settlement 291, 309 generally notes that ‘authority […] is 
something of which one can have more or less’. 
 
 
A rejected proposal in the PCIJ’s Advisory Committee of Jurists was to establish a 
formal ranking of teachings.22 While the proposal itself was unrealistic, it reveals an 
underlying view that the weight of teachings varies between different works. This 
variation is noted in the ILC’s Customary International Law Conclusions,23 and by 
writers.24  
 
ICJ judges have cited some writers more often than others. The following table shows 
the 10 most-cited writers, and how many times they have been cited.25 The count does 
not include self-citations.26 A list of the 40 most-cited writers is included in the 
Annex. 
 
Table 1: The 10 most-cited writers 
Rank Writer Citations 
1 Rosenne, Shabtai  233 
2 Lauterpacht, Hersch 119 
3 Fitzmaurice, Gerald 67 
4 Hudson, Manley O. 55 
5 Oppenheim, Lassa 53 
6 Jennings, Robert 52 
7 de Visscher, Charles  51 
8 Brownlie, Ian 42 
9 Watts, Arthur  32 
9 Stone, Julius  32 
 
The results can be illustrated with the following figure, which lists the 10 most-cited 
writers along the horizontal x axis, and the number of times each has been cited along 
the vertical y axis. 
                                                 
22 Permanent Court of International Justice Advisory Committee of Jurists, Procès-Verbaux of the 
Proceedings of the Committee June 16th–July 24th 1920 with Annexes (Van Langenhyusen 
Brothers 1920) 336. 
23 International Law Commission, Report of the International Law Commission Sixty-eight session (2 
May-10 June and 4 July-12 August 2016) (A/71/10) (United Nations 2016) 111.  
24 Eg The American Law Institute, Restatement of the Law of Foreign Relations of the United States, 
vol 1 (American Law Institute Publishers, 1987) 38. 
25 Jennings, Watts, Oppenheim, Jiménez de Aréchaga, and Brownlie are also among the most-cited 
writers in the WTO Appellate Body: Helmersen, supra note 2, at 333-334. 





Figure 1: The 10 most-cited writers 
 
Citations of teachings are ‘a useful measure of influence’, even though it ‘is not the 
same as influence’, and ‘only one measure of influence’.27 Under that assumption, 
those most-cited writers are, at least prima facie, the ones whose works have the most 
weight and influence.  
 
A related finding is that a small number of writers have been cited many times. The 
top ten most-cited writers have been cited a total of 726 times. This represents 17.9 % 
of a total 4050 citations (again excluding self-citations). While a total of 1280 writers 
have been cited in ICJ opinions, more than half of them (694) were cited only once. In 
other words, the top 0.8 % writers have more citations (726) citations than the bottom 
50 % (640). Another significant figure is that the top 10 % most-cited writers have 
2077 citations, which is just over 50 % of the total. By contrast the 10 % least-cited 
writers have 128 citations, which is 3 % of the total. 
 
The results are illustrated in the pie chart below. The largest slice represents the top 
10 % most-cited writers, the second largest represents the 10 to 20 % most-cited 
writers, and so on, until the last slice which represents the bottom 10 %. 
 
                                                 
27 Sandesh Sivakumaran, ‘The Influence of Teachings of Publicists on the Development of 










Figure 2: Writers' shares of all citations 
 
3. THE FACTORS 
A. Introduction 
This section identifies factors that seem to influence the weight of teachings among 
ICJ judges.28 The factors are mainly based on apparent attempts by judges to ‘justify’ 
references to teachings, by highlighting the quality of a work, the expertise of a 
writer, the official authority of a writer, and agreement among multiple writers. 
 
Some judges do not ‘justify’ any of their references to teachings. Those who do, do 
not justify all of their references. There are examples of opinions where some 
references are justified while others are not, and even footnotes where only some 
references are justified. One reason for this is that a single justification may apply to 
multiple references. For example, in Bosnia Genocide, Judge ad hoc Kreća referred to 
teachings by William A. Schabas multiple times, but called Schabas ‘the learned 
author’ only once.29 A judge could also justify one reference because the judge 
perceives the work in question to have less weight than other works that are cited 
                                                 
28 This terminology is found eg in Stephen Hall, International Law (2nd edn, LexisNexis Butterworths 
2006) 59. 
29 Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, supra 
note 11, Separate Opinion of Judge ad hoc Kreća 542. 
Top 10 %
11 to 20 %
21 to 30 %
31 to 40 %
41 to 50 %
51 to 60 %
61 to 70 %
71 to 80 %




(without being justified). For example, it is interesting that Judge ad hoc Pirzada in 
the Aerial Incident of 10 August 1999 (Pakistan v. India) case justified his reference 
to R. P. Anand by calling him a ‘well-known Indian writer’,30 but did not justify 
references to Ian Brownlie or Shabtai Rosenne. The latter two are among the Court’s 
most-cited writers, and Judge ad hoc Pirzada may have felt that it was necessary to 
justify including Anand in the same context. On the other hand, a judge may justify 
one reference to show that it has a greater significance than other references. An 
example could be Judge ad hoc Van den Wyngaert in the Arrest Warrant case, who 
referred to one work as ‘very thorough’, and the rest as ‘other’.31 In any of these 
cases, the implication seems to be that different teachings have different weight. 
 
It is possible to compare how often each type of justification is made. This gives a 
rough indication of the relative importance of each factor. The quality of works and 
expertise of writers are the most common types of justifications, with 198 mentions of 
quality, and 190 of expertise. The official positions of writers were mentioned 107 
times, while agreement between writers was mentioned 32 times. The ILC, in the 
Customary International Law Conclusions, argues that ‘it is the quality of the 
particular writing that matters rather than the reputation of the author’,32 and 
Sivakumaran seems to agree.33 While the purely quantitative analysis done in this 
paragraph suggests that expertise and quality are equally important in practice, that 
does not finally settle the matter. It is not possible to know precisely how important 
each judge considers the two factors (to the extent they even have a clear view on the 
matter). The most plausible view is that this varies from judge to judge (and more 
generally from lawyer to lawyer).  
 
B. Expertise  
This section argues that judges give more weight to writers whom they consider 
experts. This is indicated by judges’ practice of justifying references to teachings by 
                                                 
30 Aerial Incident of 10 August 1999 (Pakistan v. India), Jurisdiction of the Court, Judgment, I.C.J. 
Reports 2000, p. 12, Dissenting Opinion of Judge ad hoc Pirzada 95-96. 
31 Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Belgium), Judgment, I.C.J. 
Reports 2002, p. 3, Dissenting Opinion of Judge ad hoc Van den Wyngaert 166. 
32 ILC, supra note 23, at 111. 
33 Sivakumaran, supra note 27, at 12. 
 
 
emphasising the expertise of the writer.34 For example, judges have used terms that 
reflect the general expertise of writers, calling them ‘expert’,35 ‘learned’,36 
‘distinguished’,37 and a variety of similar terms. Judges have also used terms that 
apparently focus on other actors’ perceptions of the writers, such as ‘well-known’,38 
‘famous’,39 and ‘influential’,40 and other such terms. Some statements highlight the 
consistent quality of an author’s works, such as ‘characteristically thoughtful’,41 
‘characteristically thorough’,42 and ‘characteristic cogency’.43 That is another way of 
saying that the author is an expert. Yet another writer was praised for having ‘so often 
and so brilliantly contributed to the cause of international law and justice’.44 Some 
statements draw more historical lines. Judge Trindade often discusses the ‘founding 
fathers’ of international law.45 Among them are ‘Grotius himself’,46 as referred to by 
Judge Weeramantry. Weeramantry has also (and similarly) referred to ‘fountainheads 
of international law’.47 Some judges have designated writers, works, or institutions as 
                                                 
34 Ibid., at 11. 
35 Eg Request for Interpretation of the Judgment of 15 June 1962 in the Case concerning the Temple of 
Preah Vihear (Cambodia v. Thailand) (Cambodia v. Thailand), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2013, p. 
281, Separate Opinion of Judge Cançado Trindade 339-340. 
36 Eg Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide 
(Croatia v. Serbia), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2015, p. 3, Separate Opinion of Judge Owada 169. 
37 Eg Fisheries case, Judgment of December 18th, 1951: I.C.J. Reports 1951, p. 116, Dissenting 
Opinion of Sir Arnold McNair 182. 
38 Eg North Sea Continental Shelf, supra note 12, Dissenting Opinion of Vice-President Koretsky 157. 
39 Corfu Channel case, Judgment of April 9th, 1949: I.C.J. Reports 1949, p. 4, Dissenting Opinion by 
Judge Krylov 72. 
40 Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, 
Provisional Measures, Order of 13 September 1993, I.C.J. Reports 1993, p. 325, Separate Opinion 
of Vice-President Weeramantry 378. 
41 Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia, supra note 7, 
Separate Opinion of Judge Dillard 168. 
42 Fisheries Jurisdiction (United Kingdom v. Iceland), Merits, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1974, p. 3, 
Separate Opinion of Judge Dillard 68. 
43 Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of 
America), Provisional Measures, Order of 10 May 1984, I.C.J. Reports 1984, p. 169, Dissenting 
Opinion of Judge Schwebel 197-198. 
44 South West Africa, Second Phase, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1966, p. 6, Dissenting Opinion of Judge 
Jessup 325-326 (also cited by Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua, supra 
note 10, Dissenting Opinion of Judge Schwebel 267-268). 
45 Eg Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence in Respect of 
Kosovo, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 2010, p. 403, Separate Opinion of Judge Cançado 
Trindade 552-553. 
46 Land and Maritime Boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria, Preliminary Objections, Judgment, 
I.C.J. Reports 1998, p. 275, Dissenting Opinion of Vice-President Weeramantry 372-373. 
47 Maritime Delimitation in the Area between Greenland and Jan Mayen, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 
1993, p. 38, Separate Opinion of Judge Weeramantry 239. 
 
 
being or having ‘authority’,48 ‘authoritative’,49 and similar terms. Further praise has 
focused on more specific competence. Writers have been called ‘one of the 
forerunners of the international protection of human rights’,50 ‘the first writer on 
intervention before the PCIJ’,51 ‘the leading author on genocide’,52 and many similar 
designations. 
 
A single reference to a writer being ‘most qualified’53 is the only one that mirrors the 
wording of the ICJ Statute Article 38(1)(d). However, the terms mentioned here all 
generally seem to express the same sentiment that was inferred from the ICJ Statute in 
Section 2 above, that some writers are more ‘highly qualified’ than others and that 
this affects the weight of their teachings. 
 
Writers have also been singled out for being ‘one of the directors of’ the ‘Revista 
peruana de Derecho internacional’54 and ‘Secretary of the Institute of International 
Law’.55 The point seems to be that these positions imply and require a certain 
expertise. Along with the reference the ‘Secretary of the Institute of International 
Law’, the Institute was said to have ‘had a substantial share in the preparation of the 
first drafts of the Convention’ that was discussed.56 This means that the expertise was 
not just on a general level, but related specifically to the legal instrument that was at 
issue in the case. 
 
                                                 
48 Eg Case concerning the Application of the Convention of 1902 governing the Guardianship of 
Infants (Netherlands v. Sweden), Judgment of November 28th, 1958: I.C.J. Reports 1958, p. 55, 
Separate Opinion of Judge Sir Hersch Lauterpacht 96. 
49 Eg Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000, supra note 31, Joint Separate Opinion of Judges Higgins, 
Kooijmans and Buergenthal 72. 
50 Application of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial 
Discrimination (Georgia v. Russian Federation), Preliminary Objections, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 
2011, p. 70, Dissenting Opinion of Judge Cançado Trindade 306. 
51 Sovereignty over Pulau Ligitan und Pulau Sipadan (Indonesia/Malaysia), Application for 
Permission to Intervene, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2001, p. 575, Separate Opinion of Judge ad hoc 
Weeramantry 647. 
52 Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, supra 
note 11, Separate Opinion of Judge Tomka 347. 
53 Nuclear Tests (Australia v. France), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1974, p. 253, Dissenting Opinion of 
Judge de Castro 381. 
54 Colombian-Peruvian asylum case, Judgment of November 20th 1950: I.C.J. Reports 1950, p. 266, 
Dissenting Opinion by Judge Azevedo 344. 
55 Case concerning the Application of the Convention of 1902 governing the Guardianship of Infants, 




The Institut de Droit International (IDI) as such has also been the subject of praise.57 
It has been called ‘authoritative’58 and ‘learned’59 (alongside the International Law 
Association, or ILA). Judge Weeramantry in Nuclear Weapons noted that an IDI 
resolution was supported by ‘an illustrious list of the most eminent international 
lawyers of the time’.60 The implication may be that even though the IDI as an 
institution has a certain authority, the expertise of the specific individuals who are at 
any time involved in its work affects the weight of that work. 
 
The assumption that the weight of teachings varies by the writer’s expertise is also 
found in teachings themselves,61 and in the ILC.62 D’Aspremont suggests that the 
reputation of the institution where a writer is employed can be used as a proxy for 
expertise,63 which is plausible. 
 
C. Quality 
Judges justify some citations of teachings by saying something about the quality of 
the specific work. Various terms have been used.  
 
Some terms relate to qualities of the text itself, such as ‘clearly’,64 ‘objective’,65 
‘comprehensive’,66 and various others. Other terms focus specifically on the judges’ 
                                                 
57 Eg Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, supra note 12, Dissenting Opinion of Judge 
Weeramantry 500 and 518-519. 
58 Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia, supra note 7, 
Separate Opinion of Judge Dillard 162-163. 
59 Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Germany v. Italy: Greece intervening), Judgment, I.C.J. 
Reports 2012, p. 99, Dissenting Opinion of Judge Cançado Trindade 194 and 197. 
60 Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, supra note 12, Dissenting Opinion of Judge 
Weeramantry 508. 
61 Hersch Lauterpacht, The Development of International Law by the International Court (Stevens and 
Sons 1958) 24; L Oppenheim, ‘The Science of International Law: Its Task and Method’ (1908) 2 
American Journal of International Law 313, 345; Karol Wolfke, Custom in Present International 
Law (2nd edn, Martinus Nijhoff 1993) 156. 
62 ILC, supra note 23, at 111. 
63 Jean d’Aspremont, ‘Wording in International Law’ (2012) 25 Leiden Journal of International Law 
575, 582. 
64 Eg Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company, Limited, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1970, p. 3, 
Separate Opinion of Judge Jessup 192. 
65 Fisheries Jurisdiction, supra note 42, Separate Opinion of Judge de Castro 80. 
66 Eg North Sea Continental Shelf, supra note 12, at Dissenting Opinion of Judge Sorensen 242. 
 
 
use of the teachings, such as ‘useful’,67 ‘valuable’,68 ‘helpful’,69 and the like. Yet 
other terms are about other actors’ perceptions of the teachings. These include, among 
others, ‘generally accepted’,70 ‘celebrated’,71 and ‘influential’.72 The terms 
‘standard’73, ‘classic’,74 and ‘leading’75 may also be taken as attributes that are shaped 
by the perceptions of other actors: What is a or the standard, leading, or classic work 
in a field depends on the views of the actors in that field. The adjective ‘well’ is also 
used in various contexts, as in ‘well described’ and the like.76  
 
The IDI has been said to have been ‘preside[d] [over] with such distinction’,77 which 
presumably leads to a high-quality result. One writer’s observations were ‘useful to 
note’.78 Another writer was part of a ‘predominant legal theory’,79 while yet another’s 
work contained some of ‘the insights of modern analytical jurisprudence’.80 One 
judge referred to ‘De Jure Belli ac Pacis itself’,81 apparently implying that this work 
has a special status. One work had ‘never been surpassed’.82 Other writings were 
                                                 
67 Eg Territorial and Maritime Dispute (Nicaragua v. Colombia), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2012, p. 
624, Declaration of Judge Keith 743. 
68 Application for Revision of the Judgment of 11 July 1996 in the Case concerning Application of the 
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina 
v. Yugoslavia), Preliminary Objections (Yugoslavia v. Bosnia and Herzegovina), Judgment, I.C.J. 
Reports 2003, p. 7, Separate Opinion of Judge ad hoc Mahiou 70. 
69 Aerial Incident of 3 July 1988 (Islamic Republic of Iran v. United States of America), Order of 13 
December 1989, I.C.J. Reports 1989, p. 132, Separate Opinion by Judge Shahabuddeen 157. 
70 Aegean Sea Continental Shelf, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1978, p. 3, Dissenting Opinion of Judge de 
Castro 69. 
71 Eg Certain expenses of the United Nations (Article 17, paragraph 2, of the Charter), Advisory 
Opinion of 20 July 1962: I.C.J. Reports 1962, p. 151, Dissenting Opinion of President Winiarski 
229. 
72 Eg Continental Shelf (Tunisia/Libyan Arab Jamahiriya), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1982, p. 18, 
Dissenting Opinion of Judge Oda 199. 
73 Eg Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company, Limited, supra note 64, Separate Opinion of 
Judge Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice 85. 
74 Eg Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua, supra note 10, Separate Opinion 
of Judge Sir Robert Jennings 546. 
75 Eg Land, Island and Maritime Frontier Dispute, supra note 6, Dissenting Opinion of Judge Oda 737. 
76 Eg Continental Shelf, supra note 72, Separate Opinion of Judge Ago 97. 
77 Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, supra note 12, Dissenting Opinion of Judge 
Weeramantry 518-519. 
78 Ibid., at 543. 
79 Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, supra note 12, Dissenting Opinion of Vice-
President Schwebel 322-323. 
80 Arbitral Award of 31 July 1989, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1991, p. 53, Dissenting Opinion of Judge 
Weeramantry 163. 
81 Land and Maritime Boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria, supra note 46, Dissenting Opinion of 
Vice-President Weeramantry 372-373. 
82 Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua, supra note 10, Dissenting Opinion of 
Judge Schwebel 285-286. 
 
 
‘without any exaggeration whatever’.83 Yet another work ‘better described’ the law.84 
Other works have been called ‘the most exhaustive treatise on the subject’85 and 
‘respectable authority’.86 One work was said to have ‘persuasive force’.87 In another 
case there was ‘not better’ writing on a subject than the teachings that were cited.88 
Another opinion cited ‘a unique systematic work’.89 One judge argued that ‘a court of 
law need not look beyond the words of Charles de Visscher’.90 
 
Some justifications straddle the line between referring to the author (as described in 
section 3.B above) and the work itself (as described in this section). For example 
Judge Schwebel in the Nicaragua case referred to an ‘authoritative’ interpretation 
(which is about the work), but did so in connection with mentioning that the author 
was a former legal director of the Organization of American States (which is about 
the author).91 The joint separate opinion of Judges Higgins, Kooijmans and 
Buergenthal in the Arrest Warrant case referred to ‘the authoritative Pictet 
commentary’.92 This is a reference to the work, but its author was employed by the 
ICRC, which also published the text, and which has a significant role in the field on 
international humanitarian law. These references should be seen as belonging to both 
categories, which illustrates that both quality and expertise are important to the weight 
of teachings. 
 
That works of high quality have more weight means that works of low quality have 
less. An example of a judge pointing to the low quality of specific teachings is found 
                                                 
83 Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. case (jurisdiction), Judgment of July 22nd, 1952: I.C.J. Reports 1952, p. 93, 
Dissenting Opinion of Judge Levi Carneiro 167. 
84 Maritime Delimitation in the Area between Greenland and Jan Mayen, supra note 47, Separate 
Opinion of Judge Ajibola 287. 
85 South-West Africa–Voting Procedure, Advisory Opinion of June 7th, 1955: I.C.J. Reports 1955, p. 
67, Separate Opinion of Judge Lauterpacht 104. 
86 Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company, Limited, supra note 64, Separate Opinion of Judge 
Jessup 183. 
87 Case concerning the Application of the Convention of 1902 governing the Guardianship of Infants, 
supra note 48, Separate Opinion of Sir Percy Spender 124-125. 
88 Colombian-Peruvian asylum case, supra note 54, Dissenting Opinion by M. Caicedo Castilla 364. 
89 Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, supra 
note 36, Separate Opinion of Judge ad hoc Kreća 495. 
90 Arbitral Award of 31 July 1989, supra note 80, Separate Opinion of Judge Shahabuddeen 119. 
91 Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua, supra note 10, Dissenting Opinion of 
Judge Schwebel 388. 
92 Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000, supra note 31, Joint Separate Opinion of Judges Higgins, 
Kooijmans and Buergenthal 72. 
 
 
in the opinion by Judge Oda in Land, Island and Maritime Frontier Dispute. He noted 
that while scholars were unanimous, this had ‘little […] value’ because their 
conclusions were based on a single decision of the Permanent Court of Arbitration, 
which they according to Oda had read too much into.93  
 
The assumption that the weight of teachings depends on their quality is shared by 
writers,94 and by the ILC in the Customary International Law Conclusions.95 Writers 
mention various aspects of such quality.  
 
For example, Rosenne argues that ‘non-governmental scientific organizations’ have ‘a 
special place’ because their works are produced through ‘a Socratic dialog, cut and 
thrust coupled with a great deal of give and take’.96 Sivakumaran similarly claims that 
‘[t]he process through which the teaching is created is also of relevance’.97  Quality 
may therefore also be a matter of procedure, as opposed to merely substance, as long 
as that procedure can be presumed to produce good substance.  
 
Hall mentions ‘relevance’ and ‘age’ among ‘factors which are relevant in determining 
the relative persuasive weight attached to different’ teachings.98 Oraison also 
mentions age.99 However ‘age’ in this sense is already covered by ‘relevance’, since 
older works will grow less relevant as the law changes. Age alone should not 
therefore have any independent effect on the weight of a work. Moreover, relevance is 
a not an appropriate factor for determining the weight of teachings, it is instead 
significant when deciding whether it is useful to consult and cite them in the first 
place. This is why, even though the ‘relevance’ of teachings has been emphasised by 
judges,100 it is not mentioned in the above list of the ways in which judges emphasise 
the quality of teachings.  
                                                 
93 Land, Island and Maritime Frontier Dispute, supra note 6, Dissenting Opinion of Judge Oda 748. 
94 Eg Oppenheim, supra note 61, at 345. 
95 ILC, supra note 23, at 111. 
96 Shabtai Rosenne, Practice and Methods of International Law (Oceana 1984) 121. 
97 Sivakumaran, supra note 27, at 10. 
98 Hall, supra note 28, at 59-60. 
99 André Oraison, ‘L’Influence des Forces Doctrinales Académiques sur les Prononcés de la C.P.J.I. et 
de la C.I.J’ (1999) 32 Revue Belge de Droit International 205, 228. 
100 Eg Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (New Application: 2002) (Democratic Republic 
of the Congo v. Rwanda), Provisiona1 Measures, Order of 10 July 2002, I.C.J. Reports 2002, p. 




Another aspect of ‘quality’ that is emphasised by various writers is whether the work 
is objective, including whether it sticks to lex lata discussions, as opposed to straying 
into lex ferenda territory.101 Similar assumptions about weight and objectivity can 
also be found in the ILC’s work on customary international law.102 They are also 
reflected in national judicial decisions such as the United States Supreme Court’s 
Paquete Habana decision103 and  West Rand Central Gold Mining Co. v. The King 
from the English High Court of Justice.104 This point of view finds support in the use 
of ‘objective’ as a term to justify references to teachings in individual opinions, as 
noted at the beginning of this subsection. Lex lata works may be more relevant than 
lex ferenda works to most judges because they prefer to find the law rather than to 
create it.  
 
D’Aspremont mentions ‘place of publication […] among the parameters that 
determine whether an argument gains authority’.105 That is plausible, but the ICJ 
judges’ opinions do not reveal whether they consider it. 
 
D. Official Positions 
According to the ICJ opinions that are studied here, the official position of a writer 
seems to affect the weight of their teachings. Many of the most-cited writers in the 
ICJ have themselves been ICJ judges or have held other official positions, for 
example as government legal advisers or counsel. For example, among the ten most-
cited writers mentioned in Section 2, five were judges of the PCIJ and ICJ 
(Lauterpacht, Fitzmaurice, Hudson, Jennings, and de Visscher). Watts was a 
government legal adviser, and Rosenne was an ambassador. This is an indication that 
the official position of the writer affects the weight accorded their teachings. 
                                                 
101 Eg Anthony D’Amato, ‘What Does It Mean to be an Internationalist?’ (1989) 10 Michigan Journal 
of International Law 102, 104. However, Robert Y Jennings, ‘What is International Law and How 
Do We Know It When We See It’ in Martti Koskenniemi (ed), Sources of International Law 
(Ashgate 2000) 27, 46-47 questions whether ‘such a distinction can readily be made’. 
102 International Law Commission, Third report on identification of customary international law by 
Michael Wood, Special Rapporteur (A/CN.4/682) (United Nations 2015) 45; ILC, supra note 23, at 
111. 
103 United States Supreme Court, The Paquete Habana (1900) 175 U.S. 677, 700. 
104 English High Court of Justice, West Rand Central Gold Mining Co. v. The King [1905] 2 KB 391, 
402. 




Judges have, moreover, justified their references to teachings by mentioning some 
official position held by the author.106 In ICJ opinions there are many references to a 
writer being either a ‘Judge’107 or ‘President’108 of the ICJ itself. Having been a 
‘Judge’109 or ‘President’110 of the PCIJ has also been mentioned, as has as 
membership of ‘both courts’.111 A ‘President of the Arbitral Tribunal of Upper 
Silesia’ has been cited,112 and one writer was described generally as an ‘international 
judge’.113 Some opinions have referred to judges ‘writing extra-judicially’,114 ‘out of 
court’,115 and ‘in another context’116 (than as a judge). A plausible interpretation of 
this is that the writer also being a judge gave the teachings added weight.  
 
These references may have had varying motivations. The argument here is that the 
primary motivations are the writer’s special insights, general expertise, and 
acceptability to States: Having an official position of the kind discussed here usually 
means being involved in the creation and application of international law, which gives 
a special insight into the rules in question. Those who are appointed to such positions 
must generally possess significant expertise in international law in order to be 
considered in the first place. Appointments and elections are often decided by States, 
and being appointed will therefore usually imply that one’s views on and approach to 
international law is found acceptable by at least one State.  
                                                 
106 The use of ‘Judge’ or ‘President’ (or for that matter ‘Professor’) as part of the name of a writer is 
not counted here. Such usage is excluded on the assumption that this is a formality similar to the 
use of ‘Mr.’ or ‘Ms.’, and more about courtesy and correctness than about praising the person 
referred to. However, Sivakumaran, supra note 27, at 11 includes judges referring to titles such as 
Dr. and Professor in his discussion. 
107 Eg North Sea Continental Shelf, supra note 12, at Dissenting Opinion of Vice-President Koretsky 
160. 
108 Eg Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (Argentina v. Uruguay), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2010, p. 14, 
Joint Dissenting Opinion Judges Al-Khasawneh and Simma 114. 
109 Eg Admission, supra note 3, Dissenting Opinion by M. Krylov 109. 
110 Eg Corfu Channel case, supra note 39, at Dissenting Opinion by Judge Winiarski 53. 
111 Oil Platforms (Islamic Republic of Iran v. United States of America), Counter-Claim, Order of 10 
March 1998, I.C.J. Reports 1998, p. 190, Dissenting Opinion by Judge ad hoc Rigaux 229. 
112 South West Africa, supra note 44, Dissenting Opinion of Judge Jessup 434-435. 
113 Nuclear Disarmament, supra note 3, Separate Opinion of Judge Tomka 897. 
114 Eg Fisheries Jurisdiction (Spain v. Canada), Jurisdiction of the Court, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 
1998, p. 432, Dissenting Opinion of Vice-President Weeramantry 504. 
115 Land, Island and Maritime Frontier Dispute (El Salvador/Honduras), Application to Intervene, 
Order of 28 February 1990, I.C.J. Reports 1990, p. 3, Dissenting Opinion of Judge Shahabuddeen 
21. 





Some references included the nationality of the author and judge, in cases where that 
country or region was involved in the case (one reference was to Canada,117 another to 
Latin America118). This may be because those writers are seen as having a special 
relevance to the case. A similar example is the reference to writings by ‘a former 
President of the Court himself’,119 when the legal question under discussion 
concerned the meaning of the ICJ statute. Most of the Presidents and Judges are 
designated as ‘former’. Some references instead refer to the writings of someone who 
only later became a Judge at the Court: One writer was ‘now’ a Judge of the 
International Court of Justice’,120 two others were ‘later’ a member and Vice-
President of the Court respectively,121 while one was ‘shortly to become’ an ICJ 
judge.122 In those cases, special insight gained from the position at the Court could not 
be the motivation for the reference. Rather their later appointment to the Court should 
be seen as a proxy for their expertise and their acceptability to States.  
 
In the cases mentioned here, there are more references to Presidents (17) of the ICJ as 
there are to regular Judges (12). This despite there being fourteen times as many 
judges as presidents on the Court at any time. Regardless of the fact that all presidents 
have also been judges, and that the average tenure as president is shorter than that of a 
judge, there are more former judges than former presidents of the ICJ. The 
discrepancy in justifications may be caused by the assumption that the position of 
President requires more personal competence, gives a greater insight into the work of 
the Court, and represents a greater degree of trust from States. 
 
                                                 
117 Fisheries Jurisdiction, supra note 114, Dissenting Opinion of Judge Torres-Bernárdez, Judge ad hoc 
656. 
118 Obligation to Negotiate Access to the Pacific Ocean (Bolivia v. Chile), Preliminary Objection, 
Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2015, p. 592, Separate Opinion of Judge Cançado Trindade 6. 
119 Judgment No. 2867 of the Administrative Tribunal of the International Labour Organization upon a 
Complaint Filed against the International Fund for Agricultural Development, Advisory Opinion, 
I.C.J. Reports 2012, p. 10, Separate Opinion of Judge Cançado Trindade 80. 
120 Aerial Incident of 10 August 1999, supra note 30, at 105. 
121 Eg Continental Shelf (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya/Malta), Application to Intervene, Judgment, I.C.J. 
Reports 1984, p. 3, Dissenting Opinion of Judge Schwebel 141. 
122 Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua, supra note 10, Dissenting Opinion 
of Judge Schwebel 394. 
 
 
Judges citing teachings have also mentioned that writers have been ‘Registrars’ of the 
ICJ.123 This position has some of the same features as that of judge, in that it may 
denote insight into the work of the Court, personal competence, and proximity to 
States. Furthermore, judges have mentioned that writers have been members of the 
ILC.124 ILC membership is based on personal competence, gives insight into the 
development of specific areas of international law, and requires approval by States. 
 
A different group of references to teachings has mentioned the writer’s participation 
in the drafting of the rules that the judge was discussing. They include negotiators, 
delegates, and advisers in the negotiations of legal documents,125 and (other) members 
of drafting or revision committees or conferences.126 One writer had prepared a draft 
of a treaty provision,127 another made a ‘prominent contribution to the discussion 
leading to the drafting of’ the ICJ’s own rules.128 Similar references are to writers who 
were ‘Secretary of the Institute of International Law, which had a substantial share in 
the preparation of the first drafts of’ a treaty (as mentioned in Section 3.B), a ‘former 
Belgian delegate and jurisconsult whose knowledge of the United Nations dates from 
the San Francisco Conference’,129 and ‘who was present on behalf of [the] Court both 
in the Committee of Jurists at Washington and in the relevant Committee of the 
Conference of San Francisco’.130 The motivation behind these references seems to be 
the special insight that participation in negotiations may provide. This is in some 
sense similar to citing preparatory works. However, some citations cannot have been 
motivated by special insights: For example, one reference is to a writer who ‘later 
                                                 
123 Eg Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of 
America), Declaration of Intervention, Order of 4 October 1984, I.C.J. Reports 1984, p. 215, 
Dissenting Opinion of Judge Schwebel 236. 
124 Eg Jurisdictional Immunities of the State, supra note 59, Separate Opinion of Judge Keith 169-170. 
125 Eg Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence in Respect of 
Kosovo, supra note 45, Declaration of Judge Tomka, Vice President 464. 
126 Eg Case concerning the Aerial Incident of July 27th, 1955 (Israel v. Bulgaria), Preliminary 
Objections, Judgment of May 26th, 1959: I.C.J. Reports 1959, p. 127, Joint Dissenting Opinion by 
Judges Sir Hersch Lauterpacht, Wellington Koo and Sir Percy Spender 174. 
127 Maritime Delimitation in the Area between Greenland and Jan Mayen, supra note 47, Separate 
Opinion of Judge Weeramantry 237. 
128 Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, 
Counter-claims, Order of 17 December 1997, I.C.J. Reports 1997, p. 243, Dissenting Opinion of 
Vice-President Weeramantry 290. 
129 Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia, supra note 7, 
Dissenting Opinion of Judge Gerald Fitzmaurice 240. 
130 Case concerning the Aerial Incident of July 27th, 1955, supra note 126, Joint Dissenting Opinion by 
Judges Sir Hersch Lauterpacht, Wellington Koo and Sir Percy Spender 174. 
 
 
became a member of the Committee which drafted the Statute of the Permanent 
Court’.131 Since this author at the time the cited text was written had yet to participate 
in the negotiations, the reference cannot have been motivated by any special insight 
that the writer could have gained. Writers having participated in negotiations also says 
something about their personal competence more generally, and is a form of 
proximity to States.  
 
Some references have concerned writers who have held official positions in 
intergovernmental organisations and the like: one ‘Secretary-General of both the 
Stockholm and the Rio Conferences’,132 one ‘Deputy Secretary of the United Nations 
Sea-Bed Committee’,133 one ‘Vice-Chairman of the Permanent Mandates 
Commission’ (and ‘one of the most active members’),134 and one ‘former Director of 
the Department of Legal Affairs of the OAS’.135 These references too may have been 
about expertise, insight gained from experience, and acceptability to States. Other 
opinions refer to writers’ positions in State governments, such as a ‘Legal Adviser of 
the United Kingdom’s (UK) Permanent Mission to the United Nations between 1991-
1994’,136 a US ‘Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs’,137 
and a ‘President of the Supreme Court of Senegal’,138 and other similar positions. The 
posts of supreme court judge and legal adviser require some competence as a lawyer, 
and the references may in part be about the expertise of the writer. However, the 
position of Assistant Secretary of State is more of a political than a legal job, and does 
not to the same extent imply competence on legal questions. It rather implies 
proximity to State power. The position of legal adviser to the UN was brought up in 
                                                 
131 Legality of the Use by a State of Nuclear Weapons in Armed Conflict, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. 
Reports 1996, p. 66, Dissenting Opinion of Judge Weeramantry 142. 
132 Request for an Examination of the Situation in Accordance with Paragraph 63 of the Court’s 
Judgment of 20 December 1974 in the Nuclear Tests (New Zealand v. France) Case, I.C.J. Reports 
1995, p. 288, Dissenting opinion by Judge ad hoc Sir Geoffrey Palmer 407-408. 
133 Fisheries Jurisdiction, supra note 42, Declaration by Judge Ignacio-Pinto 38. 
134 South West Africa Cases (Ethiopia v. South Africa; Liberia v. South Africa), Preliminary 
Objections, Judgment of 21 December 1962: I.C.J. Report: 1962, p. 319, Dissenting Opinion of 
President Winiarski 451. 
135 Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua, supra note 10, Dissenting Opinion 
of Judge Schwebel 384. 
136 Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, supra 
note 11, Separate Opinion of Judge Tomka 320. 
137 Oil Platforms (Islamic Republic of Iran v. United States of America), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 
2003, p. 161, Separate Opinion of Judge ad hoc Rigaux 387-388.  
138 Gabčikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hungary/Slovakia), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1997, p. 7, Separate 
Opinion of Vice-President Weeramantry 91. 
 
 
connection to a question of UN law, which shows that at least this reference can have 
also been about insight gained from the position.  
 
Finally, some references do not fit any of the paragraphs above, but nonetheless seem 
to focus on the official authority of writer. A general reference to a writer being ‘no 
less an insider than […]’ is one example. 139 Another reference was to a writer who 
was a ‘well-known [...] statesman’,140 and yet another was to writings by the ‘counsel’ 
in the present case.141 One judge mentioned that a writer was ‘cited in the Counter-
Memorial of Peru as an authority in matters of American international law’.142 The 
implication seems to be that when a State approves of teachings by incorporating 
arguments into their memorial, this gives the teachings a veneer of official authority. 
 
A study of the WTO Appellate Body showed that ‘many of the authors that have been 
cited the most […] have connections with governments’.143 That finding is in line 
with the ICJ’s emphasis on writers’ official positions. 
 
The assumption that a writer’s official position affects the weight of writings is also 
shared by writers themselves. For example, teachings mention that the ‘repute’,144 
‘prestige’,145 or ‘reputation’146 of a writer is a factor when determining the weight of 
teachings. This should be read as a reference to (among other things) official positions 
held by the writer. According to Waibel, ‘[t]he influence of interpretive communities 
is inversely related to their openness’.147 This should mean that official positions that 
are more difficult to obtain also give the office holder a greater influence on the law, 
including through teachings. Pellet holds that judges ‘form a very special part of the 
                                                 
139 Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay, supra note 108, Joint Dissenting Opinion Judges Al-Khasawneh 
and Simma 114. 
140 North Sea Continental Shelf, supra note 12, Dissenting Opinion of Vice-President Koretsky 157. 
141 Request for an Examination of the Situation in Accordance with Paragraph 63 of the Court’s 
Judgment of 20 December 1974 in the Nuclear Tests (New Zealand v. France) Case, supra note 
132, Dissenting opinion by Judge ad hoc Sir Geoffrey Palmer 386. 
142 Colombian-Peruvian asylum case, supra note 54, Dissenting Opinion by M. Caicedo Castilla 365. 
143 Helmersen, supra note 2, at 334. 
144 Hall, supra note 28, at 60. 
145 Andrew Clapham, Brierly’s Law of Nations: An Introduction to the Role of International Law in 
International Relations (7th edn, Oxford University Press 2012) 67. 
146 Wolfke, supra note 61, at 156. 
147 Michael Waibel, ‘Interpretive Communities in International Law’ in Andrea Bianchi, Daniel Peat, 




legal doctrine in that, sitting on the bench, their authors have had the benefit of 
listening to the contrary arguments of the parties’.148 Thus, some of the increased 
weight of teachings written by judges is explained by the judges’ immersion in 
specific cases. This cannot be a full explanation, however, since justifications of 
citations based on official authority are not limited to legal issues with which the 
writers dealt in an official capacity.  
 
E. Agreement Between Multiple Writers 
Another factor that affects the weight of teachings is whether multiple works are in 
agreement. Various examples can be found in the ICJ’s practice. First of all, among 
the seven references to teachings in the ICJ’s majority opinions (as mentioned in 
Section 2), one is to multiple works (‘the successive editors of Oppenheim’s 
International Law’), while another three are to collective bodies (the IDI, and the 
ICRC twice). Thus, only a minority of the citations of specific works (three out of 
seven) are to individual works by individual writers. Other majority opinions have 
contained unspecific references to ‘writers’, ‘writings’, and the like, which should be 
read as a reference to multiple agreeing works. Thus, the ICJ’s majority opinions have 
mostly invoked multiple writers at once, as opposed to individual writers.149  
 
In individual opinions, some judges have referred to ‘agreement’ between 
teachings,150 and to views that have been ‘accepted’151 or ‘approved’152 by other 
teachings, and various similar phrases. One judge ad hoc asked rhetorically whether 
‘the Court [should] not have given more consideration to the factor that war crimes 
and crimes against humanity have, by many, been considered to be customary 
international law crimes’.153 Thus, the opinion of ‘many’, presumably writers, 
mattered.  
                                                 
148 Alain Pellet, ‘Article 38’ in Andreas Zimmermann and others (eds), The Statute of the International 
Court of Justice: A Commentary (2nd edn, Oxford University Press 2012) 731, 869. 
149 Eg Wolfke, supra note 61, at 156. 
150 Eg Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, 
supra note 11, Dissenting Opinion of Judge ad hoc Mahiou 419. 
151 Eg Aegean Sea Continental Shelf, supra note 70, Dissenting Opinion of Judge de Castro 69. 
152 Eg Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company, Limited, supra note 64, Separate Opinion of 
Judge Tanaka 144. 





Judges have also used lack of agreement among writers as an argument against giving 
weight to their views. One judge argued that ‘some authorities seem to support’ one 
view, but ‘most authorities do not mention’ it ‘and even reject it’.154 A judge ad hoc 
found it significant that a ‘controversial interpretation’ was ‘not upheld by the greater 
part of scholarly opinion’.155 Judge ad hoc Kreća in Croatia Genocide cited an ILC 
text which ‘however, mentions only one article’, implying that the failure to cite 
multiple works that agreed with each other reduced the weight of the ILC text.156  
 
Works by collective institutions such as the IDI will by definition be backed by 
multiple concurring individuals. This should give them a default level of weight that 
is greater than that of ‘regular’ teachings. There are examples of judges apparently 
considering IDI texts to be authoritative.157 A particularly interesting example is 
Judge Weeramantry’s opinion in Nuclear Weapons, where he emphasised how an IDI 
resolution ‘was adopted by 60 votes, with one against and two abstentions’.158 Thus it 
was significant not just that the resolution came from the IDI, but that such a large 
number of people concurred. Judge (and former President) Tomka, sitting in an 
academic panel, similarly ‘expressed his scepticism regarding the value of resolutions 
adopted by learned societies purporting to reflect customary international law when, 
for instance, few members of that society are present and the resolution is adopted by 
a thin majority’.159 Individual ICJ opinions contain a total of 191 references to 
‘institutional’ teachings: 85 to the IDI, 29 to the ICRC, 18 to the ILA, 15 to the 
American Law Institute, and 14 to Harvard Law School. 
 
                                                 
154 Ibid., at 157-158. 
155 Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, supra 
note 11, Dissenting Opinion of Judge ad hoc Mahiou 404. 
156 Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, supra 
note 36, Separate Opinion of Judge ad hoc Kreća 495. 
157 Eg Case concerning the Arbitral Award made by the King of Spain on 23 December 1906, 
Judgment of 18 November 1960: I.C.J. Reports 1960, p. 192, Dissenting Opinion of Judge Urrutia 
Holguin 224. 
158 Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, supra note 12, Dissenting Opinion of Judge 
Weeramantry 508. 
159 Judge Tomka quoted in Amelia Keene (ed), ‘Outcome Paper for the Seminar on the International 
Court of Justice at 70’ (2016) 7 Journal of International Dispute Settlement 238, 260. 
 
 
It may also be significant that a single writer has held the same view consistently. For 
example, Judge Jessup in South West Africa noted that ‘[a]fter a decade had passed, 
Lord McNair evidently found no reason to change his view’.160 As mentioned above, 
one of the two references to specific teachings in ICJ majority opinions was to ‘the 
successive editors of Oppenheim’s International Law’. The significance of this may 
have been not only that multiple editors agreed, but also that individual editors held 
on to their views throughout successive editions. 
 
More generally, judges often cite multiple authors for the same point. One motivation 
for this is probably that citing multiple writers is seen as more authoritative than 
citing only one. 
 
The idea that the weight of teachings in international law varies with the number of 
agreeing writers finds support in the Renard case from the English Court of 
Admiralty, which asked rhetorically ‘who shall decide, when doctors disagree?’.161 
The Franconia case from the English Court for Crown Cases Reserved nonetheless 
reminds us of the limits of scholarly unanimity, by noting that ‘no unanimity on the 
part of theoretical writers would warrant the judicial application of the law on sole 
authority of their views’.162  
 
Scholars themselves assume that teachings have more weight if multiple writers 
agree,163 as does the ILC.164 
 
An interesting aspect of agreement between writers is whether the writers represent 
different regions of the world. Scholars argue that this is one reason why collective 
institutions (such as the IDI) ‘have special authority’,165 and the ILC’s Customary 
International Law Conclusions agrees.166 However, it is not clear that this is 
something ICJ judges consider important.  
 
                                                 
160 South West Africa Cases, supra note 134, Separate Opinion of Judge Jessup 406. 
161 English Court of Admiralty, The ‘Renard’ [1778] 165 All ER 51, 51-52.  
162 English Court for Crown Cases Reserved, The Queen v. Keyn [1876] 2 Ex D 63, 202. 
163 Eg Lauterpacht, supra note 61, at 24. 
164 ILC, supra note 102, at 45. 
165 Eg Virally, supra note 15, at 153. 
166 ILC, supra note 23, at 112. 
 
 
4. THE COLLECTIVE NATURE OF AUTHORITY IN INTERNATIONAL 
LAW  
There are numerous examples of individual ICJ opinions that, when citing teachings, 
use terminology that implies that weight is determined through a collective process. 
As mentioned in Section 3, Judges have referred to works and authors as being, for 
example ‘well-known’, ‘famous’, ‘influential’, ‘celebrated’, and ‘generally accepted’. 
The same point can be inferred from terminology that is used in teachings themselves. 
For example, ‘repute’,167 ‘prestige’,168 and ‘recognised competence, impartiality and 
authority’169  (emphasis added) and similar terms have been mentioned as factors that 
affect the weight of teachings. These terms must necessarily refer to a collective 
process.  
 
More generally, the concepts of quality, expertise, and the authority of an institution 
cannot be ascertained by a single individual in a vacuum. What one person finds to 
constitute quality, expertise, and authority depends, at least to some extent, on the 
judgement of others. There is thus a continuous collective process which produces a 
loose consensus about what constitutes ‘quality’ in writing about international law, 
who the greatest ‘experts’ on international law are, and which institutions are the most 
authoritative.170 However, the process itself and its results are rarely explicitly 
discussed or written down. The process is, instead, informal and largely tacit. 
 
An interesting aspect of this is what may be called the ‘Matthew Effect’, meaning that 
‘rewards tend to be skewed towards those who are already highly reputed’.171 When a 
specific work is cited in a judicial decision, this may have been done because that 
work had more weight than others, but it may also give the cited work even more 
weight simply by the fact that it was cited in a judicial decision.172  
 
                                                 
167 Hall, supra note 28, at 60. 
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5. INCENTIVES FOR JUDGES  
A. Introduction 
Judges have incentives to use and cite authoritative teachings. Three such incentives 
are discussed here: increased the authority of the judges’ opinion, saving time, and 
complying with the ICJ Statute Article 38(1)(d). 
 
B. Increased Authority 
Citing an authoritative work may make a judicial opinion look more authoritative. 
Lawyers aspire to have their work accepted by others. This holds true of academics 
who publish research and of lawyers pleading before judges, but also of judges 
themselves.173 Therefore, one reason why judges cite teachings seems to be that they 
think it will improve how they are perceived by other actors.174 Teachings can 
therefore be cited ‘for strategic reasons’.175 It is possible to distinguish between a 
‘defensive’176 and an ‘offensive’ aspect of this ‘strategic’ function. The ‘defensive’ is 
about preventing criticism of an opinion, while the ‘offensive’ is about convincing 
others of its cogency. References to teachings can ‘enhance […] credibility’, ‘create 
the impression of being thoroughly versed in the relevant literature’, and associate the 
judge ‘with greatness’.177 This may in turn ‘contribute to the overall persuasiveness of 
judicial opinions, helping to create a general impression that decisions are well 
supported’.178 According to Cole, teachings citations ‘can […] increase the 
persuasiveness of the award for the parties’,179 and can ‘[reduce] the likelihood that 
the tribunal’s award will be controversial, as it can be seen to be based upon a 
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trustworthy source’.180 In this context, more authoritative teachings will be a more 
‘trustworthy source’.  
 
However, the opposite effect is also possible, in that an absence of references to 
teachings may make a judicial decision look more authoritative. The implication of 
not citing teachings may be that the judge considers their opinion to be authoritative 
enough on its own. This is a plausible reason why ICJ majority opinions almost never 
cite teaching (as noted in Section 1), while teachings are cited more frequently in 
individual opinions, which have a lower inherent authority.181 
 
It is intuitive that higher-quality works are more authoritative. A work that is better 
written, more thorough, or more ‘celebrated’ (as per Section 3.C), will be more likely 
to espouse views that other lawyers agree with. This is significant when authority is 
seen as a collective process, as discussed in Section 4.  
 
When judges cite works that their audiences are unfamiliar with, the judges must 
themselves be in a position to distinguish authoritatively between higher quality and 
lower quality teachings in order for the authority-by-association effect to apply. ICJ 
judges have this authority, but not all lawyers do. However, if audiences repeatedly 
disagree with a judge’s designation of high-quality teachings, trust in the judge’s 
assessments is undermined. Judges therefore have an incentive not to invoke quality 
too often, and to do so only when they actually believe that the work is good. 
 
An additional effect of emphasising the quality of a cited work is that it shows that the 
judge has made an effort to assess the work and a conscious choice about citing it. 
Judges can cite works that they have not even read,182 but by emphasising the quality 
of a cited work, the judge shows that the citation is ‘genuine’. This makes the opinion 
look more thorough and informed, which contributes to its authority.  
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Much the same applies to expertise. The title of expert is generally extended to writers 
who have a history of espousing views that that others have agreed with, and writers 
who possess outstanding knowledge and insight about the law, which in turn makes 
them more likely to hold views that are shared by others. More expert writers 
therefore have more authority, and citing them contributes to the more to the authority 
of an opinion than citing less expert writers. ICJ judges are in a position to distinguish 
authoritatively between more and less expert writers.   
 
According to the analysis presented in Section 3, references to a writer’s official 
positions are used as proxies for their expertise and their acceptability to States. 
Citing a writer who is acceptable to States in an opinion increases the likelihood that 
States will have a favourable view of the opinion. This is particularly important to the 
ICJ, since it is States that bring the Court’s cases, and compliance with the Court’s 
decisions is dependant on States accepting them (since decisions are not enforced).  
 
While judges rely on their own authority when they assess quality and expertise, such 
authority is less important when judges refer to writers’ official positions. There is a 
rough but broad agreement about which official positions that confer what authority 
in international law, to a much greater extent than there is agreement on the precise 
quality and expertise of every specific writer and scholarly work.  
 
Judges also tend to emphasise that multiple writers agree. All else being equal, when 
more writers agree on a point, it is more likely that they are correct. This point is 
nevertheless tightly bound up with expertise and quality. The opinion of one 
outstanding writer is worth more than the opinion of two poor ones (and probably 
even more than ten poor ones). The significance of agreement between writers as an 
authority-enhancing factor therefore increases exponentially when it is combined with 
other the other factors discussed here. 
  
C. Saving Time 
On a more practical level, citing authoritative writers can save time for judges. This is 
in part because authoritative writers are, at least presumably, more likely to be correct 
about the law. Raz argues that ‘[a]uthoritative utterances can be called “content‐
independent” reasons’, meaning that they are ‘not conditional on […] agreement on 
 
 
the merits’.183 Hernández uses similar terminology, and holds that ‘content-
independent’ authority ‘carries weight due to the probability of having merit’.184 
Applied to judges citing teachings, this means that judges can trust the views 
authoritative writers, and spend less time on independent research or prolonged 
deliberation. Similarly, Cole points out that consulting teachings ‘allows [judges] to 
draw from expertise it might not itself possess’ and ‘can […] increase the likelihood 
that [their] understanding of international law is correct’.185 Another way to phrase 
this is that teachings ‘relive the judge’,186 since they allow a judge ‘to invoke the 
authoritative writing and proceed without further analysis or argument’.187 While this 
time-saving function of teachings can be significant, it also carries risks. Teachings 
are ‘at one remove’ from ‘primary sources’,188 and reliance on them may discourage 
independent consultation of the sources that are cited. Teachings may, for example, be 
used ‘as evidence of the existence and content of custom instead of thoroughly 
analyzing state practice’.189 
 
Relying on a writer whose expertise is reputed, can undoubtedly save a judge time. If 
the judge knows that the writer is good, they can look at their work and trust that is 
likely to be correct. The same is true for a writer who holds or has held an important 
official position, since official positions can be seen as proxies for expertise, as 
discussed in Section 3 above. In addition to this, citing a writer who holds an official 
position may contribute to the persuasiveness of the opinion towards the institution in 
question. Citing the writings of a sitting ICJ judge could increase the likelihood that 
the opinion will be accepted by that judge, or even by the Court as a whole. 
 
By contrast, reading (and citing) multiple writers who agree necessarily takes time, 
and is therefore not something that will save time for judges. A similar point can be 
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made about citing high-quality works. A work must usually be read quite thoroughly 
in order to establish its quality, which also takes time. If a judge already knows that a 
work is good, they can consult it more quickly next time. If the second time around 
they consult a specific passage or chapter whose quality they have not yet assessed, 
they can build on a presumption of quality, which can save time. If the presumption is 
extended to other works by the same writer, it is more correct to say that what is 
invoked is the writer’s expertise, rather than the quality of the work. Therefore, 
quality is not part of the ‘content-independent’ authority discussed above. 
 
D. Compliance With the ICJ Statute Article 38 
ICJ judges are bound by the ICJ Statute, including Article 38. They should therefore 
be interested in grounding their methodological approach in the wording of Article 
38. 
 
The first three of the factors discussed in Section 3, expertise, quality, and official 
positions, can be linked to the phrase ‘the most highly qualified publicists’ in the ICJ 
Statute Article 38(1)(d). The ‘most highly qualified publicists’ are those with the most 
expertise. In many cases they will also write the highest-quality teachings. Holding an 
important official position should also be seen as an aspect of being ‘most highly 
qualified’. This is because appointment requires expertise, and because doing the 
work enhances expertise. Moreover, the official positions in question are ones that 
confer a certain authority merely by holding the office. As regards the fourth factor, 
unanimity, this too has a connection to the ICJ Statute Article 38(1)(d), which speaks 
about ‘teachings’ and ‘publicists’, in plural. That these writers should represent 
different regions is in line with the wording of the ICJ Statute Article 38(1)(d) and its 
focus on ‘publicists of the various nations’. All  of the factors that were identified in 
Section 3 can thus be traced back to the ICJ Statute Article 38(1)(d). The factors are 
part of the legal framework that governs the work of the ICJ and its judges. 
 
That being said, the determination of what constitutes ‘quality’ and ‘expertise’ will to 
some extent be subjective. Judges can form their own opinion on what constitutes 
good legal writing, who is a good lawyer, and (to a lesser extent) which official 
positions that are the most authoritative. While the community of international 
 
 
lawyers have developed certain shared guidelines, as discussed in Section 4, 
individual lawyers and judges are to some extent free to form their own views. Thus, 
while the factors are part of the Court’s legal framework, they do not ‘bind’ or restrict 
the judges to any significant extent.  
 
6. WHO ARE ‘THE MOST HIGHLY QUALIFIED PUBLICISTS’? 
The data presented in this article makes it possible to count which writers who are 
subject to the highest number of ‘justifications’ (ie where judges justify a reference to 
teachings by emphasising the quality of a work or the expertise or official position of 
the writer). The first nine are H. Lauterpacht, Rosenne, Jiménez de Aréchaga, G. 
Fitzmaurice, Hudson, Jennings, Oppenheim, Huber, and Jenks, while the tenth place 
is shared between Elias, Morelli, Pufendorf, Radbruch, Scelle, and Wolff. The data 
are illustrated in the figure below, which shows writers along the horizontal x-axis 




Figure 3: Writers by number of 'justifications' of citations 
 
An alternative way to identify the ‘most highly qualified publicists’ is to count who is 
cited most often. The ten most-cited writers, as mentioned in Section 2: Rosenne, H. 
Lauterpacht, G. Fitzmaurice, Hudson, Oppenheim, Jennings, de Visscher, Brownlie, 










Counting the number of judges who cite a writer is thus a useful supplement to 
counting how many times each writer is cited, since ‘individual judge’s preferences 
skew the data’.190 
 
The ten writers cited by the highest number of judges: Rosenne, H. Lauterpacht, 
Oppenheim, Jennings, Hudson, G. Fitzmaurice, de Visscher, Brownlie, Watts, and 
Waldock. The data are illustrated in the figure below, which shows the writers along 




Figure 4: Writers by number of judges citing them 
 
This shows that while the numerical analyses identify Shabtai Rosenne as the most-
cited writer among ICJ judges, the most ‘justified’ writer is Hersch Lauterpacht. None 
of these statistics say anything final or decisive about who the ‘most highly qualified 
publicists’ are, but they do say something about which writers the judges think highly 
of and prefer to cite. It can also be mentioned that Lauterpacht is cited on, and wrote 
about, a wider variety of topics than Rosenne, who focused heavily on the procedural 
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law of the ICJ itself. Who are ‘the most highly qualified publicists’ should depend on 
which area of international law one is talking about. 
 
7. CONCLUSION 
This article has argued that ICJ judges consider the following factors when assessing 
the weight of teachings: the quality of a work; the expertise of a writer; the official 
positions of a writer; and whether multiple writers agree. It seems that the process by 
which the weight of teachings is determined is collective, informal, and largely tacit. 
Judges’ incentives for distinguishing between teachings and citing the ones with more 
weight probably include a desire to make their opinions authoritative and to save 
time. Compliance with the Court’s legal framework may also play a role, but this 
framework leaves judges significant discretion. Determining exactly who ‘the most 
highly qualified publicists’ are is difficult, including because counting citations and 
counting citations with ‘justifications’ yield different results, and because the results 
may vary between fields of international law.  
 
This article has explored one aspect of how teachings are used by one Court; many 
research questions remain, for example about other courts and tribunals, other sources 
and subsidiary means that courts and tribunals apply, all the other functions that 
teachings have in the international legal system, and whether current practices are 
normatively defensible. The methodology used in this article could provide a starting 





ANNEX: THE 40 MOST-CITED WRITERS 
 
Rank Writer Citations Including self-citations 
 (Trindade, A. A. Cançado) (0) (297) 
1 Rosenne, Shabtai  233  
2 Lauterpacht, Hersch 119  
3 Fitzmaurice, Gerald 67 (72) 
4 Hudson, Manley O. 55  
5 Oppenheim, Lassa 53  
6 Jennings, Robert 52  
7 de Visscher, Charles  51  
8 Brownlie, Ian 42  
9 Watts, Arthur  32  
9 Stone, Julius  32  
11 Schwarzenberger, Georg  31  
12 Higgins, Rosalyn 30 (31) 
12 Schachter, Oscar  30  
14 Guyomar, Geneviève 28  
14 Aréchaga, Eduardo Jiménez de 28  
16 Jenks, C. Wilfred 24  
16 McNair, Arnold  24  
16 Hambro, Edvard  24  
19 Brierly, James Leslie  23  
20 Guillaume, Gilbert  22  
21 Anzilotti, Dionisio 21  
21 McDougal, Myres S. 21  
21 Waldock, Humphrey  21  
24 Kelsen, Hans  20  
24 Schabas, William A.  20  
26 Cheng, Bin  19  
26 Thirlway, Hugh 19  
28 Kolb, Robert 18  
28 O’Connell, Daniel Patrick 18  
 
 
 (Simma, Bruno) (8) (18) 
30 Reuter, Paul Jean-Marie 17  
31 Grotius, Hugo 16  
31 Guggenheim, Paul 16  
31 Tams, Christian 16  
31 Verhoeven, Joe  16  
31 Elias, Taslim O.  16  
 (Oda, Shigeru) (7) (16) 
36 Jessup, Philip C.  14 (18) 
36 Robinson, Nehemiah  14 
 
36 Singh, Nagendra  14 
 
36 Vattel, Emer de  14 
 
40 Buergenthal, Thomas 13 
 
40 Rousseau, Charles  13 
 
40 Shelton, Dinah L. 13 
 
40 Wright, Quincy 13 
 
40 Bedjaoui, Mohammed  13 
 
 
